在中國科技發展的停滯中，中文到底扮演了怎樣的角色？

本文轉自爬山虎

連結:http://www.ptfcn.com/bencandy.php?fid=51&id=826

中文標題:在中國科技發展的停滯中，中文到底扮演了怎樣的角色？
原文標題:What role did language play in China's scientific stagnation

來源連接:http://www.thehistoryforum.com/forum/viewtopic.php?f=71&t=29668

China had historically been a place of great scientific advancement and is well known for having beaten Europe to a great many innovations and discoveries. However, by at least the sixteenth century China's scientific and technological advancement had entered a period of prolonged stagnation, one which allowed Europe to overtake China in the sciences.
歷史上，中國的科技水平曾一度走在世界前列，並被公認為在創新與發明方面遙遙領先於歐洲。然而至少自十六世紀起，中國的科技水平陷入了長時間的停滯。而正是這段停滯，給了歐洲在科技領域反超中國的機會。

The Needham question asks why China suddenly fell behind Europe in the sciences. Joseph Needham himself argued that it was the rising negative political and cultural impact of Confucianism and Taoism which stifled advancement, perhaps similar to the European Dark Ages. While perhaps partially accurate, this argument seems insufficient on its own to fully explain the phenomenon.
李約瑟難題正是在在探討這樣一個問題：為什麽近代中國在科技領域會突然落後於西方呢？李約瑟本人認為，正是道家學說和儒家思想在文化和政治上不斷上漲的消極影響，遏制了科技進步，這種情況或許類似於歐洲中世紀的情形。這種觀點雖然在某些方面是準確的，但還是不足以完完全全地解釋這種現象。
“李約瑟難題”：“如果我的中國朋友們在智力上和我完全一樣，那為什麽像伽利略、托里拆利、斯蒂文、牛頓這樣的偉大人物都是歐洲人，而不是中國人或印度人呢？為什麽近代科學和科學革命只產生在歐洲呢？……為什麽直到中世紀中國還比歐洲先進，後來卻會讓歐洲人著了先鞭呢？怎麽會產生這樣的轉變呢？”

One interesting case I've heard put forward is that the Chinese language itself played a prohibitive role in terms of scientific advancement beyond a certain point. While the Chinese were advanced enough to invent the printing press many years ahead of Europe, the Chinese language lacked an alphabet or system of writing which could be easily codified into a mass-producible typeset. As a result, printing remained an exclusive and expensive practice in China.
我聽說過一個有趣的觀點：是中國的語言本身扮演了阻止科技的進步的角色，並使後者在達到了一個瓶頸後就止步不前。雖然中國先進到足以發明印刷術，並能多年領先於歐洲,漢語仍然不是字母文字,也不是可以應用於大批量排版的書寫系統。其結果是，在中國，印刷仍然是一種高級和昂貴的實踐。

This contrasts dramatically with the European case, where the easy availability of printing for the emerging educated middle classes after the renaissance period allowed for the rapid spread of ideas and knowledge, and was essential for the move towards a modern scientific community and the widening of education programmes.
這與歐洲的情形截然相反。文藝複興時期後，印刷的簡便易行使各種知識能夠在受教育的新興中產階級中快速傳播,而這正是進入現代科學社會、擴大教育項目所必須的條件。

This idea reminded me of a similar but seemingly unrelated problem encountered by the Chinese relating to their written language: the difficulty of learning to read and write it with any fluency. The problem was seen as so severe that in efforts to boost literacy the young People's Republic took the drastic step of changing their written character system to the Simplified Chinese we students of the language are thankful for today.
這個想法使我想起一個與這個問題類似，不過看上去毫不相關的由中國人提出的關於他們書寫系統的問題:學習中文的書寫和閱讀十分艱難，且難以流利。這個問題被看得很嚴重,以至於中華人民共和國出於降低文盲率的考慮，大刀闊斧地將他們的書面文字體系改為簡體中文。這一點讓今天我們這幫外語學生非常感激。

Do people think that the added difficulties in learning to read and write (which probably restricted literacy on class lines more dramatically than in Europe post-Reformation) is a potential significant contributing factor to the Chinese scientific and technological stagnation of the last few centuries?
人們是否認為中文的讀寫困難（這可能遠比歐洲的古語在傳播文化方面更受限制），是一種潛在的、有可能導致過去幾個世紀的科技停滯再次上演的重要因素？

Which explanations of the Needham paradox do posters favour? Do you feel there are other significant contributing factors which are routinely ignored?
大家覺得哪一種對李約瑟悖論的解釋比較好？或者說，還有其它的重要的促成因素常常被人們所忽視掉？
評論翻譯
Smilin' dave
Couldn't it be argued that the diversity of languages in Europe would act as an equally significant barrier to the spread of ideas?
這樣說的話，那麽歐洲語言的多樣化不也是非常不利於思想的傳播嗎？

In support of a cultural explanation:
- There was no development of a simplified mass language because there was no 'need'. The more complicated language probably served the elites well enough, and the peasantry would have gotten no value from it. There really wasn't much of a middle class right up until the collapse of imperial China.
在文化層面上解釋，就是——中國沒有發展出一種簡化了的群眾語言，其原因是根本沒這種“需要”。較為複雜的語言對精英階層來說是很不錯的，不過農民們則難以領會其中的奧義。而直到中華帝國的崩潰，中國都沒有形成龐大的中產階級。
- While a number of ideas/concepts occurred in China first, it was often only in Europe that these things reached full potential. Gunpowder in the classic example.
如果一個想法或是概念在中國被首先提出，它常常是到了歐洲才能被發揮出全部的潛能。火藥就是個典型的例子。

Yu-Hsing Chen（回ls）
What is the definition of middle class here?
There is also a misconception of using the late 19th century Qing as a biometer for the entire Ming / Qing era. ignoring the obvious problems that was plauging it at the time (like how it's entire fertile and cultured region in the south was completely overran by the Taiping rebellion)
中產階級的定義是什麽？
有一種誤區是，人們常用19世紀晚期的清朝來代表整個明清時期，卻忽視了一個明顯的問題：當時的清朝正處在國力衰弱，疲敝動亂的情況下（中國的整個南方地區土地肥沃，文化發達，但在當時卻陷入了太平天國起義的動亂當中）

As far as I can see, based on the fact that most sources points to the better days of Ming / Qing era typically having several MILLION people at most given time who's passed the lowest level of the imperial exam (call the children's exam) . this exclude kids who are still learning, and women who aren't allow to take the test. and the guys who since quit their studies or aren't actually learned enough (since the exam is not just about literacy, it is testing on Confucian text) . (We are abosalutely sure of figures of guys passing the next level, the county test, typically hovering in the 500-600K range nation wide.)
在我看來，原因是這樣的：大部分資料都顯示出，在明朝和清朝的典型治世中，國家擁有上百萬在特定時間通過了最低水平科舉考試（也叫孩子們的考試）（童生？）的人才。這批人中不包括還在上學的學生和女人，也不包括已經肄業和沒有學到家的男人（因為考試不僅僅是考驗識字水平，還考儒家經典）。（我們明確的地知道在全國範圍內,更高一級考試——鄉試的通過人數在500-600K的範圍內浮動）

Many scholar now believe that at it's height in the Song dynasty, the actual literacy rate in the Song was somewhere close to 25-30%, while even in the Ming/Qing it was probably 15-20% or so (this is based on it's better days, and not when everything is going to hell for them), from everything I hear of Europe at the time, I have doubts that there is really much separation if not being the other way around.
許多學者認為，科舉制在宋代達到了頂點，當時實際的識字率大約是25-30%，而在明清時期也不過是15%-20%左右（這還是在明清的盛世時期的數據，而不是國家衰敗的時期）；反觀同時期的歐洲，我懷疑如果沒有其他的什麽事情發生，歐洲應該還沒有統一。

Yu-Hsing Chen
As for the Needhamquestion, there are a couple of aspects IMHO.
A. the need:
After the collapse of the western Roman empire, Europe was never united again, thus there was a constant pressure on almost all states of potential war, yet such was not the case in China, where each major dynasty typically sees at least a hundred year of near total peace.
對於Needham的問題，我個人有一點拙見，以下是我的兩點意見：
一、出於需要
西羅馬帝國解體後，歐洲就再沒統一過，因而對每個國家來說都有潛在的戰爭威脅。而在中國就不是這樣，中國的各大王朝至少都維持了百年的整體和平。

Military technology develope due to military need, that much is a no-brainer, yet for example, in the reign of Wanli emperor in late 16th century China, typically seen as one of the more troubled times of the Ming, the Ming dynasty fought a total of 6 notable wars in his 50ish year rule. and of these only 3 were really serious (the Imjin war against the Japanese, the war to finally subdue the Mongols in his early reign, and the war against the rising Manchus that would end up replacing the Ming in his late years) while 3 were meh (a major military garrison rebellion , one of the 9 garrison in the north rebelled, a local chieften in the South took over a portion of modern day Sichuan in the 1590s, and a border war against the Burmese that was kinda a joke given the huge disaparity in military competence of the two side at the time)
軍事技術的發展取決於軍事需要，這是個很簡單的道理。以萬歷年間的中國為例，16世紀後期的中國通常被認為處在明朝的困難時期。而在萬歷皇帝50年的在位時期內，中國共打了6場著名的戰爭，其中只有3場是至關重要的（對日Imjin戰爭、早年征服蒙古的戰爭、以及在其晚年對抗新興的滿族的戰爭——後者最終取代明朝統治了中國），另外3場規模較小（一場是對付軍事要塞的叛亂——明朝北部9大軍事要塞之一發生了叛亂事件；一場是在對付南部的一位當地首領，這位首領在16世紀90年代曾掌控過四川的部分地區；還有一場是對緬甸的邊境戰爭，由於兩方的軍事實力差距太大，這場戰爭幾乎是用來搞笑的）

We're talking about a Dynasty who's realm is roughly the size of Western Europe, yet in a 50 year span that's considered rough, they had 3 sort of major war and 3 smaller war.
我們所談論的是一個版圖和整個歐洲差不多大小的帝國，而在大概50年間，他們打了三場類型的大規模戰爭和3個規模較小的戰爭。

Military technology often push the bonderies of human technology, and in China the need simply wasn't consistently there. you might say they did TOO good of a job in bashing in the head of all their competitor . by the Qing era there was even a backward trend as the Qing was keen on keeping their nomadic core at the heart of their military. so it is quite arguable that by the Opium war in 1839, the Qing army was infact significantly technologically inferior to the Ming army of 1639.
軍事技術往往推動著人類科技的發展，只不過在中國，這種對軍事技術的需求並沒有一以貫之的保持下來。你或許會認為他們在迎頭痛擊敵人這種事兒上做得有點太好了——幾乎好過頭了。接替明朝的清朝熱衷於保持自己的遊牧民族特色，並且一直讓八旗軍擔任軍事力量的核心，而這種做法無疑是一種倒退和退步。因此在1839年鴉片戰爭開戰之前，清朝軍隊在技術上很可能連1639年的明朝軍隊都遠遠不如。

B. the key break through: the series of events that lead to the west discovering the Americas and new trade rout was one of the key reason that it surged forward . one could say that China reached a pinnical of the old world's restriction and stayed there. but when Europe discovered a new world they moved ahead into a new set of rules. something China was simply completely left out of.
二、關鍵的突破：西方人通過一連串的事件發現了美洲並並開辟了貿易的新航路，這正是西方迅猛發展的一個關鍵原因。人們或許會說中國曾在舊世界建立了一套準則和規範，並在自己的勢力範圍內堅持這套規則。但是當歐洲發現了新世界，並且建立起了新的遊戲規則時，中國的那一套就被拋到一邊了。

The need to look for a new trade rout had much to do with the closing of the old, which had much to do with the Mongol invasion and the subsequent rise of the Ottoman empire. the closing of the old trade rout killed the old traditional commerical power like the Italian states (and more over, the middle east. hence the decline of the middle east is also explained) and in the desperation to find a new rout the European forced the limits of the knowledge and technology, and was rewarded greatly.
由於蒙古的入侵和奧斯曼帝國的崛起阻礙了舊路線的貿易流通，歐洲人亟需開辟一條新的航路。由於舊路線的廢棄，一些曾經的商業中心也隨之衰落——比如說意大利（還有中東的許多地方，日後中東的衰落也證實了這一點）。在僅擁有有限的知識和技術的前提下，歐洲人最終在絕境中發現了一條新貿易路線，並獲得了巨大的成功。

Smilin' dave
（回複“中產階級是什麽？”）
Generally speaking its an economic/societal thing. I would suggest a metric of a class that has not insignificant property holdings (be that land, a business concern or whatever). In modern terms this might be a little vague. However distinction is even more pronounced in a relatively feudal system as existed in China, where the upper class and it's chosen servants (which is essentially what the scholars were for) are defined in large part by title.
一般來說是一個經濟或社會上的概念。我認為這是一個階級，這個階級並不占有無關緊要的財產（比如土地，商業關系或是其他什麽的）。如果用現代術語來解釋的話可能有點含糊。不過在中國的封建體制中在這種系統中，由於他們所擁有的權力，上層階級和他們所選的僕人（後者一般都是學者）與他人的差別要顯著得多。

The peasant on the other hand had no property of value (if they held land, it was too small to be effective) and certainly no official title. So China's middle class seems to have consisted of landlords, and later on a thin layer of urban professionals.
另一方面，農民沒有真正值錢的個人財產（即使他們有自己的耕地，土地的面積也太小，起不了多大用），也沒有官方的正式權力。因此中國的中產階級似乎是由一群地主所組成，而後來可能還有居住在城市中的專業人員。

Yu-Hsing Chen
(回ls)
Except that you miss the point of relative social mobility here. the scholars' title is not a father to son thing, but one that is based on the imperial exam.
There is a mountain of evidence that the vast majority of scholars who pass the exams came from families of only relatively notable wealth (aka, small land owners) , or at least weren't direct decendents of other officals . (there is a small degree of title inheritency, but it is without a doubt that the majority of influential officials did not rise through this route)
除此之外，你遺漏了一點：中國的社會階級是有流動性的。學者們的權力不是世襲的，而是來自科舉考試。
大量的證據表明，絕大多數通過考試的學者只不過來自稍微優裕一點的家庭(又叫做小地主)，或者至少不是其他大官的直系後裔（確實有一些權位是世襲的，但毋庸置疑的是，大多數官員走的都不是這條道兒）。

The term "peasants" gets thrown around so much that many draw the same conclusion that Chinese peasants = European medieva l peasants, aka serfs who have almost no legal rights, no true property, and almost no chance of changing their social status . which is the complete opposite of what the majority of Chinese farmers were actually like. (for example, the single biggest order of busniess for local officals of the time is to settle local legal disputes, usually between different farmers. this includes everything from marriage to property to all sorts of random stuff.)
“農民”（peasant）這個術語被到處濫用，以至於很多人得出了這樣的結論：中國農民=歐洲中世紀農民，就如同那些毫無法律權利的農奴，沒有個人財產，也幾乎沒有改變其社會地位的機會。這和中國大多數農民的情況完全相反。（比如，地方官員在經濟問題上下達的最高命令常常是為了解決當地農民之間的法律糾紛，這些糾紛從婚姻問題到財產歸屬應有盡有）

I can easily throw you just about every notable offical from the Song to Qing, which is consisted almost entirely of such examples (barring some Qing dynasty cases where they were Manchurian noblemans)
But let's just start with one very easy one, the Song era offical Oyang Xiu, who became a fairly influential offical in his own right (he was the governor of the capital city), but was probably more remembered for his cultural importance. he is widly famous for being recorded that he was raised by a single mother, and that he actually learned to write on sand, as the single mother couldn't afford any pens and paper when he was a child
我可以很容易地把從宋朝到清朝的著名官員拿出來作為反駁你的例子，他們都符合我上述所說的情況（不過清朝有一些例外，它的一些官員是滿族貴族）
讓我先舉個容易點的例子吧。宋朝的官員Oyang Xiu（猜猜他是誰？）是一位非常有影響力的大官（他曾是宋朝首都的地方長官），不過其在文化上的貢獻更為人所津津樂道。他由單身母親獨自帶大的故事廣為人知，在他小時候，由於他的母親付不起紙筆的錢，他靠在沙子上劃拉漢字學會了書寫。

While he is obviously on the rather extreme side of a poor guy making it. it's quite common for guys with little to no background becomming officals in China, something that can change the fortune of his entire clan for the next couple of generation usually. which is also why most villages hoard together resources to hire teacher to teach their brighter kids how to read and write with the hope of them earning fame and fortune through this system.
顯然，他是當時社會中極度貧困的那類人之一。這類人通常在自己的仕途上並沒有什麽背景可以依靠。而在中國，這種東西有可能大大影響一個家族的年輕一代，甚至改變整個家族的命運。這也就是為什麽很多村莊會籌集財物，以聘請教書先生教他們比較聰明的孩子們讀書識字，並期盼他們能夠利用這個體制賺取錢財和聲名的原因。

The social mobility is a very key reason on the stability of the later Chinese dynasties, because almost anyone can potentially become high ranking officals. the officals most likely come from common backgrounds, and will go back to common backgrounds when he retires, thus the entire society ties together tightly and the class distinction and struggle become much less noticable.
社會階層的流動性是後來中國王朝維護其社會穩定的關鍵因素，因為幾乎每個人都有可能成為位高權重的大官。這些官員很有可能來自同樣的背景，而在他退休的時候也很有可能回到同樣的背景中去，因此整個社會的聯系十分緊密，而階級差別和階級鬥爭也被大大地減弱了。

If you even pass the basic county level exam, your considered a Xiu Tsai, aka into the "scholar" level. which give you the right to speak to all but the highest level officals on even grounds (aka, you don't need to bow to him, he can't arrest you without extremely strong evidence. ) and there were tons of Xiu Tsai running around China during the era, at the least 1 out of 100 man was a certified Xiu Tsai (or more) and those prospecting to join that class is several times that.
如果你通過了基本的縣一級考試，你就會被稱為“秀才”，可以說已經達到了“學者”的標準。這時你有權與最高等級的官員在同等的地位上說話（也就是說，你不需要向他鞠躬，而他沒有確鑿的證據也不能逮捕你）。每100人中至少有1個人擁有“秀才”資格，而想要加入這一階層的人比這還要多上好幾倍。

Many of those Xiu Tsai would never rise to higher levels, and they worked in things like scribes or tutors or story tellers, hardly a "elite" class by any standard. stories of old Xiu Tsais who couldn't go up to the next level needing to borrow rice and money from their much less learned neighbor (and thus often earning their scorns ) are one of the most common themes to late Ming to Qing dynasty era novels.
很多秀才一直沒有晉升，他們後來成為了教師，說書人，而且不論從哪種程度上說，能進入“精英”階層的都是鳳毛麟角。在明末清初的小說中，年邁的窮秀才向沒什麽文化的鄰居借米和錢財是個屢見不鮮的題材。

Smilin' dave
Social mobility doesn't necessarily undermine class distinctions if the movement between 'layers' results in someone changing their social background. After all the US has an upper class and basically no system of title (none if you consider elected office as a different category). As I understand it the poorest could only afford the education to pass the exams by seeking sponsorship from a wealthy family for example, which ties our 'peasant' to an upper class group from day one.
如果社會“階層”可以相互轉化，並能夠改變一個人的社會背景，那麽“社會流動性”並不需要消除階級差異。畢竟美國也是有上層階級的，並且基本上沒有權力系統（如果你把選舉政府官員排除在外的話，那麽確實沒有）。我認為，最窮的人必須要向富裕的家庭尋求資助，以完成學業並通過考試，而從接受幫助的哪一天起，這些“農民”就已經與上層階級聯系起來了。

Is it also no correct that those who passed the exams didn't always find employment within the system? While they would experience some social boost from their status, such persons would enjoy no economic advantage, which brings us back to the need for significant property to be considered middle class.
那些通過了考試的人並不在體系內找工作——這種說法是不是也有點問題？他們的身份或許能帶給他們一些幫助，但是他們沒有經濟特權。他們會想要大量

The same example could be applied to Russian peasants, both pre and post serfdom. Even a serf might have some notional 'property', but they probably didn't completely own it.
同樣的例子也可以應用到俄羅斯農民身上，無論是改革前的農奴還是改革後的。即使農奴也有一些概念上的“財產”，不過他們或許不能完全擁有它。

Again, nepotism or patronage doesn't undermine class definitions.
So to re-emphasise my points
- None of this proves that there was an apparent need for a commonly used language. Indeed the scholars were in part being tested for their ability to use the language of the elite.
- None of this proves the existence of a significant middle class as emerged in Europe.
All of what you are saying is quite interesting, and probably true. However, it doesn't undermine my position in this discussion.
我再說一遍，裙帶關系和贊助不會破壞階級差異。
因此重申一遍我的觀點“
1．沒有證據證明當時的人們確實需要一種各階層通用的語言。甚至科舉考試所檢測的也是學者們對精英語言的應用能力
2．沒有證據證明當時的中國像歐洲一樣存在著明顯的中產階級。
你所說的都很有意思，而且很可能是正確的。但是，這不會動搖我的觀點。

Yu-Hsing Chen
（回複ls關於秀才找工作的部分）
There are some exception to the rule where some guys just somehow managed to learn through extraoridnary means, (such as Oyang Xiu's example there) for the most part though, the actual cost of learning was not actually that far beyond the reach of the average Chinese families, which is the key issue here. as the books were in common supply (which goes back to the printing part, as books were widely avalible and all but the most remote village most likely could pool together resource to buy some, and it was hardly just some sort of exquist collection reserved for the rich )
也有一些學子通過其他手段完成學業的例子（比如說Oyang Xiu）。大多數時候，完成學業實際所需的費用並沒高到中國一般家庭絕對無法支付的地步，而這才是問題的關鍵。書籍可以被廣泛供應（這要歸功於印刷術，它使書籍成為了唾手可得的東西。一些偏遠鄉村或許會因為貧窮而集資購買書籍。書籍絕不僅僅是一種提供給富人的高檔藏品）.

The most common method is that the individual communities would try to put together a private school where they will let those deem on the relatively bright side learn. As already noted, there was really no shortage of teachers. (if not an over supply, which meant the cost of hiring teacher was actually very low ) . truly wealthy families (bigger landlords. merchant familes) often just hire their own tutors. these private schools were called ShiXu (私塾) and were still pretty common even up to around the 1930s.
最普遍的方法是：某個社區試著建立一座學校，並且讓那些較聰穎的孩子進去讀書。就像我上面已經指出的，所謂的師資力量短缺事實上是不存在的（如果一直聘請老師的話。而這也說明聘用教書先生的費用其實很低）。實際上，真正的豪族（大地主、富商）都有他們自己的專屬教師。這些私人學校被稱為“私塾”，並且知道20世紀30年代左右，這種傳統還依舊盛行。

The final incarnation of the imperial exam essentially had 4 level (the details are obviously more complicated but for simplicity sake here..) the Childrens' exam, the County level exam (after this your considered a scholar), the provincial exam (after this your considered an official), and the Capital exam.
科舉考試分為4級（細說的話太繁雜了，所以我簡單講講。。。）：鄉試（the Childrens' exam），縣試（the County level exam）（通過即為學者），省試(the provincial exam)（通過則為官員）,還有最後的殿試。

The patronage aspect I have referred to usually isn't the learning part, it's the cost of travel, many of those Chinese provinces were bigger than a large European states. simply travelling to the provincial capital (not to meantion you need to stay there for awhile, both for the test and waiting the results) is actually a significantly heavier burden than learning itself. hence why you see why some popular late Ming/Qing stories usually revolving around the poor Xiu Tsais passing out on the street due to hunger (as his funds ran out), only to be saved by a beautiful young lady who generously helped him, unaware of his status. only for the Xiu Tsai to come back awhile later announcing that he's now a future official and would like to marry the girl etc, it's the Chinese version of the frog prince really.
我所指的贊助一般都不包括學費，它指的是旅費，中國的許多省比歐洲的一個國都大。僅僅去省會參加考試（你需要花上一段時間，不僅要在那兒考試，還要等待發榜）對於學子所在的家庭來說就是一筆沈重的負擔，遠大於學習本身。因此你就會明白為嘛在明朝末年/清朝末年的流行小說中，主角常常是個因饑餓倒在路邊的秀才（之所以餓倒是因為他的錢花光了），然後必然會有個美艷的年輕小姐慷慨解囊，並且讓他意識到了自己的身份。最後男主角歸來時必然會宣布他已得到了官職即將走馬上任，同時向當時那位小姐求婚，等等等等。這真是中國版的青蛙王子啊。

Once your past the provincial level of test, your almost surely guarnteed a government position of some sort (and if you didn't that's usually when dynasties were ready to go to hell), the final level of exam, taken in the capital itself, is more or less only relavant to your later developments. aka guys who pass the final level (the final level's passing rate is actually pretty high.) are more likely to end up being promoted faster than those who did not.
一旦你通過省試，你基本上一定會拿到一個政府職位（如果你沒有拿到，那通常只能是在王朝衰微的時候）。最後的一場考試在首都舉辦，它多多少少都會和你以後的命運掛鉤。換句話說，通過最後一場考試的人（最後一場考試的通過率實際上相當的高），其晉升速度可能遠遠高於那些沒有通過的人。

However, the most difficult part is indeed passing the provincial level part. and those that are stuck inbetween that are what your referring to, those we have the title of a scholar but very little actual economic benifits (the states do sponsor some of them with a scholarship of sort, but the majority don't get that). But they're also just potentially one stroke of the pen away from being an offical.
然而，最困難的部分其實是省試。你所指的的那些人其實是被卡在這一階考試的人，他們空有學者的頭銜，卻沒有多少經濟上的利益（美國用獎學金之類的東西贊助學者，不過也只有很少的人能夠得到它）。因此他們也有可能放棄仕途，轉而謀求其他職業。

I am more specifically trying to compare the later dynasties of China (10th century onward) to the pre - industrial Europe. the key thing remains that China was stuck in that era . while Europe moved foward. but if we compare that era to most of the comparable European eras, there is signifcant evidence that points to the Chinese system being better for the common people, relative wealth is obviously a subject of debate. but potential social movement is almost certainly higher. and due to the system that allows that, literacy rate was most likely wider spread (which goes back to the original topic, Chinese literacy rate in the the later 19th century to mid 20th century was terrible compare to industrialized Europe, but what evidence is there that this was the case before that? everything I have read suggest that in most pre industrial European area literacy rate was far south of the 20-30% that later Chinese dynasties usually can sustain.), and class distinction and struggle were significantly less.
我試圖更具體地將後期的中國王朝（約10世紀）和工業革命前的歐洲進行比較。我發現，關鍵的問題在於，中國在那個時期發展停滯了，而歐洲卻邁步向前。不過，如果我們將那個時期的中國和處於可與之相提並論的時期的歐洲相比，有大量的證據可以證明，中國顯然擁有對普通民眾而言更好的體制。相對財富顯然是個重要議題，但是潛在的社會運動的影響確實更大。由於體制允許，中國的識字率更高（這又回到最初的話題了，中國的識字率在19世紀後期至20世紀中期這段時期內，比起歐洲來說簡直糟透了，不過有什麽證據證明這是導致科技發展緩慢的原因呢？就我讀到的東西來看，歐洲工業革命前，南部的識字率是20-30%，這與中國後期大多數的王朝相同。而且中國的階級差距和階級鬥爭還少得多。

The European middle class your referring to did not actually come into serious existence until the industrial revolution (one could argue that the North American colonist reach that point earlier though. on the merits of their land grabbing). by that point and beyond anyone would surely agree that the Chinese were left behind by a mile and only by the last couple of decades have even begun to catch up. that does not actually undermine many of the merits of the later Chinese social system relative to what was going on in most of Europe until probably the early half of the 18th century at the earliest.
在工業革命前，歐洲的中產階級實際上並沒有成形（有人可能會說，北美的殖民者通過搶掠土地早已達到了這一標準）。以這種觀點來看，中國肯定早已經被他們遠遠拋在了後面，而直到近幾十年才追趕了上來。實際上，相對於18世紀乃至更晚時期的歐洲，中國體制的功績是無法被抹殺的。

Smilin' dave
Actually the middle class in much of Europe first achieve prominence in agriculture, not industry. The most natural example was the emergence of the wool trade, which created a more merchantile aspect and lead to a craze for raising sheep. To a lesser extent you have wine cultivators in France. This shift lead to practices like enclosure, which in turn reflected the end of feudal land management.
實際上很多歐洲中產階級最先搞出突出成就的領域是農業而非工業。最典型的例子就是羊毛貿易的出現，它導致了一場對養羊的狂熱。在法國，也有一些制造葡萄酒的。這些轉變導致了圈地運動的出現，從而反映了封建土地管理的結束。

Yu-Hsing Chen
THe main point in this is that there is simply little evidence in the Chinese dynasties having a lower literacy rate than Western Europe as a whole. at least until public eduction really became relatively wide spread. it was more likely to have been the other way around. due to Chinese dynasties providing high incentives for it's civilians to go into learning.
重點是幾乎沒有證據可以證明中國王朝的識字率曾經低於西歐過——至少在公共教育普及之前。這很有可能要歸因於中國王朝官員的高官厚祿，它曾一度刺激中國的人民學習文化知識。

I'm am no expert on European history , but from some tibits I pick up here and there, using say.. England (which was almost surely at the forefront of Europe in most aspects from the early 1700s onward) in 1830s there were roughly 25% of children enrolled in sunday schools in England. so add on top of that the nobilities and we come to to the conclusion that at that point the litearcy rate in England
(the best in Europe most likely) was what? in the 30-40% range ? just a little better than say.. the Song dynasty in about 700-800 years earlier.
我不是歐洲歷史的專家，不過按照我在各處零零散散看到的一些資料上說的，英格蘭（在18世紀早期，英格蘭在大多數方面都走在歐洲的前列）在19世紀30年代大約只有25%的孩子就讀於周日學校。再加上貴族們，當時英格蘭的識字率大概能達到多少？30-40%?不如說宋朝在700-800年前就達到了這一水準。

The point is, China's stagnation seem to have been little influenced by literacy rates. which was actually very high by pre-industrial standards. it was a combination of many other things, and IMHO the single largest aspect remains that because it's economic zone of influence simply remained the same and even shrank. (as the old trade routs closed down to them after the Mongolian invasion). their economic level simply never was able to reach the point that would offer them to jump onto the next level... until the Qing dynasty in the mid 1800s. and by then that was probably more of a curse than a blessing to be suddenly exposed to a whole new world .
關鍵是，識字率對中國科技發展停滯的影響其實非常有限。在工業化前，中國的識字率已經達到了很高的水準。導致發展停滯的原因有很多，而我個人認為最重要的方面依舊是這個，因為它所能影響到的經濟領域並無變化，甚至還縮水了（在蒙古入侵後舊貿易線路就被關閉了）。他們的經濟水平根本不足以讓他們直接跳到下一層次。。。直到19世紀中葉的清朝。而到了那時，人們對突然發現的新大陸可能更多的是咒罵，而非祝福。

(討論並未結束，節選到此為止)